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Abstract - The Through Life Capability Management 
(TLCM) construct, currently being embraced by defense 
departments across the globe, is a commercial and social 
endeavor that requires a multitude of socio-technical 
systems to work together effectively in a system of systems. 
TLCM demands changes in the organization and culture of 
the defense supply chain in ways that fly in the face of 
traditional commercial wisdom. This paper reports on an 
on going enterprise model that is being created as part of a 
wider research project into the management and sharing of 
knowledge across the TLCM enterprise. The model 
describes the UK MoD TLCM enterprise as a set of 
responsibilities that agents execute by accessing identified 
resources, in this instance limited to information and 
knowledge. Preliminary results indicate changes in the 
structure of the supply chain organization that raises 
significant challenges in the areas of decision making, 
knowledge sharing, organizational learning, culture and 
behavior.. 
Keywords: Decision making, distributed knowledge 
systems knowledge management, knowledge sharing, 
ORDIT, systems of systems, through life capability 
management, TLCM 
1 Introduction 
 Since 2005 the British Ministry of Defense (UK 
MoD) has been in the process of adapting a Through Life 
Capability Management (TLCM) approach to acquisition 
and to make an increasing number of the roles and 
processes traditionally carried out by the armed forces 
themselves available for industry to deliver through 
partnership arrangements [1]. This initiative reflects a trend 
in the industrial sector for suppliers and manufacturers to 
move away from selling only product commodities and, 
instead, to offer a mix of products and services where the 
supplier gives through-life support for the product or, 
system of products, for its customers [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]. 
Alternatively, companies offer customers use of an asset 
with an agreed and guaranteed availability, often in the 
form of so-called “service level agreements” [4] [7]. 
 This product-service approach results in a defense 
supply chain that is highly integrated and that sets major 
challenges to the engineering and commercial activities in 
acquisition projects. If TLCM is to deliver the benefits that 
are sought, it is not only the processes and organizational 
structures that need to be changed. The behaviors of 
customers and suppliers must change as well [9] [10]. 
Knowledge of systems must be managed effectively over 
the extended enterprise including customer, prime 
contractors, and other suppliers and over periods of many 
years, in some cases, even several decades. Participation in 
the enterprise demands that organizations on both sides 
share information and knowledge that they have 
traditionally kept to themselves.  
 This paper describes a modeling exercise of the 
TLCM enterprise that was conducted as part of a greater 
research project which focuses on how the product service 
shift affects the way in which the organizations within the 
TLCM enterprise manage and share knowledge and 
information. 
2 TLCM and Managing Knowledge 
 In the vocabulary of the British MoD, capability (the 
ability to achieve a desired military outcome) is made up of 
Force Elements at Readiness (FE@R) which are the 
various components of military force that are ready for 
deployment at a particular time and may be combined to 
provide the required force, and the eight Defense Lines of 
Development (DLoDs), which must all be developed 
appropriately in order for capability to be realized [11]. The 
DLoDs are: training, equipment, personnel, information, 
doctrine and concepts, organization, infrastructure, and 
logistics. Interoperability is sometimes included as a ninth 
DLoD.  
 In our view, the output of TLCM is not capability or 
FEs@R. After all, industry and the armed forces have 
always delivered, managed and operated capabilities in the 
form of equipment platforms, services and personnel in one 
form or another and more or less successfully. If the 
capability is the output, then the skeptics of TLCM, both in 
industry and within the MoD, are correct when they argue 
that this is what they are already doing and have been doing 
for years. Instead, we see TLCM as the overarching 
principle that directs how the processes in acquisition are 
organized, managed and performed. TLCM is the process 
or framework that manages capability through life. Hence 
the output of TLCM is the improved management of 
capability. This is an important point to make because from 
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this perspective, we are separating the technical aspects of 
creating, delivering, operating and disposing of the systems 
of systems that make up capabilities from the management 
processes that support the creation, delivery, operation and 
disposal of the capabilities and which may be regarded as a 
complex system of systems in its own right.  
 The TLCM extended enterprise can be viewed as a 
system of systems problem. Since the MoD has increased 
the number of defense support activities available to 
industry for commercial exploitation and adopted a more 
integrated supply chain, the enterprise that is the defense 
supply chain has become more complex. Interactions and 
feedback loops have become richer and greater in number 
as the organizations involved have a larger set of 
connections to each other. To a large extent, these 
interactions are made up of information or knowledge 
exchanges. The increased number of interactions induces 
complexity in its own right, but this is aggravated by legacy 
behaviors that mean that some connections work while 
others do not, resulting in information in some cases 
becoming partial. There are also many simultaneous non-
linear interactions, which means that it is not possible to 
keep track of causal relationships between the 
organizations [12].  
 A military organization is a hierarchical organization. 
But complex systems do not do well with strictly 
hierarchical structures [12]. Hierarchies are typically 
viewed as tidy nested structures with clear lines of 
communication. In complex systems, this clarity however 
may only exist on paper as, in reality, the interactions need 
to cut across hierarchical levels and also between different 
hierarchies [13]. In a complex system, the many 
interdependencies between the elements of the system 
makes it also very difficult to determine, beforehand, what 
information and knowledge is needed by whom and when. 
Forcing interactions to flow within a rigid structure may 
therefore end up being detrimental to the enterprise as a 
whole. This is not equivalent to saying complex systems 
are structure-less or chaotic but that the structures found are 
the results of the patterns of interactions that exist between 
the system’s elements, some of which are long-term and 
stable while others are transient and unpredictable [12].  
 Another reason why complex systems and 
hierarchical structures do not work well together is because 
the number and the non-linearity of the interactions also 
has implications for control within and of the system. 
Hayek [14] stated that planners in society do not possess all 
the knowledge available when conducting their work 
because knowledge is distributed throughout society. This 
results in planners not knowing what knowledge is 
available nor what additional knowledge they need because 
they are removed from the places where practical work is 
performed and the associated knowledge is held. Hayek 
also asserted that theoretical knowledge is in general more 
highly regarded than practical knowledge; and because 
planners tended to be highly educated, they also tended not 
to understand or be aware of the importance of the context 
dependant nature of knowledge relating to how and when 
things are best done. The status of theoretical vs. practical 
might have shifted somewhat since Hayek wrote his article 
in 1949 , but his main point about knowledge being 
distributed is still valid. Focusing control in one or two 
places increases the gap between decision making and 
knowledge, as decisions are taken away from the context in 
which the knowledge that could inform them is hosted, 
created and understood. It also increases the probability of 
important knowledge not entering the decision process at 
all because its existence is not known by the decision 
makers or because its importance is not understood.  
 Focusing control also forces decision makers to 
handle more transactions than they are realistically able to 
handle.. Turnbull discusses humans’ limited ability to 
process (receive, store, process and transmit) information 
which if unchecked, results in information overload [15]. 
Creating hierarchies is seen as a way of limiting the 
number of transactions that each individual involved needs 
to process, but the strategy has major weaknesses 
associated with information being condensed as it moves 
up the hierarchical structure. The decisions made in this 
context are therefore not independent because the 
information they are based on has been shaped by how 
subordinates have assessed its value and importance. The 
rich interactions and direct and indirect feedback loops 
between elements means that control is better handled 
distributed across the system where the knowledge is held.  
 A systems perspective may also have implications for 
how the nature of knowledge is perceived. Classical 
knowledge management theory often defines knowledge as 
a hierarchy consisting of data (discrete and objective facts 
about events) , information (data that has been sorted and 
analyzed to give meaning), knowledge (information linked 
with its potential application) [16] [17] [18] [19], and 
wisdom (knowledge that has an ethical perspective 
obtained through combination with perception and 
experience)[20]. From a systems’ perspective, if 
knowledge is part of the transactions within a complex 
system then knowledge does not come into being outside of 
those interactions [12]. Knowledge is not something 
subjective that humans have but something that is created 
in our dealings with others. This also means that 
knowledge cannot be broken down into discreet objective 
facts as these are meaningless without interpretation which 
occurs within interactions to become knowledge.  
 The study of management of knowledge in 
organizations takes a different view on where and how 
knowledge is hosted and created, although it recognizes the 
role of interactions in knowledge creation, learning and 
innovation [22] [23]. Nonaka [22] builds on Polanyi’s [24] 
concepts of tacit (knowledge held in people’s heads) and 
explicit knowledge (knowledge that is recorded or has 
taken physical form in some way) to create a model with 
four different types of knowledge transformation that leads 
to the invention of new knowledge and innovation. 
Tsoukas’ [23] work on firms as “distributed knowledge 
systems” offers a social constructivist approach to 
knowledge and knowledge management. This perspective 
holds that knowledge is not “given” to any individual or 
team in its entirety. Individuals have knowledge in the form 
of experience but knowledge is also constructed through 
discussion, communication and the patterns of interactions 
between the individuals involved.  
embrained knowledge that is reliant on cognitive 
competence and conceptual abilities  
embodied knowledge that is oriented towards action, 
“know how” 
encultured socially constructed knowledge that is 
manifested in a shared understanding 
embedded knowledge that is set in general routines 
encoded knowledge that communicated through 
symbols and signs in paper and electronic 
formats such as books, manuals, handbooks, 
etc 
Table 1. Blacker’s five knowledge categories [24].  
 Blackler [24] has identified five images of knowledge 
that can be identified in the literature about organizational 
learning. Building on Collins’ [25] work, he summarizes 
the knowledge types discussed into categories of being 
embrained, embodied, encultured, embedded, or encoded. 
The conclusion Blackler draws is that all workers and 
organizations, irrespective of what they do, are 
knowledgeable and that management of knowledge must 
consider an array of issues that are very complex in 
themselves. 
3 The TLCM Enterprise Model 
 The purpose of this study is to comprehend how 
stakeholders within UK MoD and industry understand the 
TLCM concept and interpret its implications for 
relationships between organizations in the overall 
enterprise. A TLCM enterprise model is derived, below, to 
address this question; the aim is to answer, at least in part, 
the following questions: 
 Who/what are the elements of the TLCM 
enterprise? 
 What are interrelationships between the 
elements? 
 What is the organizational structure? 
 The implementation of TLCM is still in its infancy. 
At present, it is only the capability planning phase that is 
fully operational within the UK MoD. The delivery phase 
is in the process being implemented as projects progress. 
The enterprise is in transition and individuals and teams 
involved, both within the MoD and in industry are working 
towards understanding what this new paradigm involves for 
them and their respective organizations. For this reason, 
this work has focused mainly on the MoD side in the 
TLCM enterprise. 
3.1 Method 
 The TLCM enterprise was modeled using the 
modeling language in the Organizational Requirements 
Definition of Information Technology Systems (ORDIT) 
methodology [26] [27]. ORDIT was developed in the 
European Union ESPRIT research and development 
program to assist stakeholders in defining IT systems to 
support their business processes. The methodology enables 
key users to define and discuss how they wish to develop 
the organization’s business processes and to consider a 
range of potential futures before deciding on a solution. 
ORDIT models the enterprise as a network of 
responsibilities performed by agents using identified 
resources, see Fig. 1 below. Models can be created to the 
level of detail that is meaningful for the business area that 
is being studied. For the purpose of this research, the 
modeled resources have been limited to encompass data, 
information and knowledge.  
 
Fig. 1. The basic components of the ORDIT modeling 
language. (Adapted from [7].) 
 ORDIT identifies three different types of relationships 
between agents: power relationships, functional 
relationships, which we have interpreted as hand-over 
relationships or relationships where elements share or 
provide knowledge or information to other elements in 
order for them to perform their task, and customer/supplier 
relationships. For the purposes of this model, we have 
added a fourth relationship, competitors, since, within 
TLCM, commercial organizations can be both partners, 
prime- and sub-contractors, and competitors to each other 
at the same time, albeit in different projects.  
 
Fig. 2 Preliminary TLCM enterprise model  
3.2 Procedure 
 Information gathering for the model has come from 
three main sources: the UK MoD Acquisition Operational 
Framework website [28], the Through Life Capability 
Management – Practitioners course held by the UK 
Defense Academy, and discussions with people that are 
involved with the development of TLCM in industry, 
academia and the MoD.  
 We identified the main agents in the enterprise and 
created for each a triangle diagram with the name of the 
agent, its responsibilities/activities/tasks and the 
information and knowledge resources used to execute it .  
 Using Microsoft Office Visio 2007 a model for the 
enterprise was created by entering the agents and adding 
the relationships between them.  
 The discussions with MoD and industry staff and 
academics working directly with TLCM and its 
implementation provided helpful feedback about the 
correctness of the modeled relationships. These discussions 
and attendance on the course also provided richness to the 
information gathered from document sources and gave 
valuable insights into the challenges faced by the 
organizations involved, as they undergo the paradigm shift 
and people’s reactions to and understanding of the TLCM 
concept. 
3.3 Results 
 The preliminary results of the TLCM enterprise 
model is shown in Fig. 2. With the exception of the unified 
customer, which is a pentagon, the UK MoD elements are 
depicted as squares while non-MoD elements are depicted 
as ovals. 
3.3.1 Description of the TLCM enterprise 
model 
 The Capability Sponsor (Cap Sponsor) is the body 
within the UK MoD that is responsible for leading the 
capability change planning process, identifying equipment 
and support requirements, and for identifying the optimum 
mixes of platforms, force enablers and force elements, 
referred to as force groupings, for each military capability. 
The Cap Sponsor is led by the Joint Capabilities Board 
(JCB) which uses the Defense Planning Assumptions, 
created by Head Office, and Future Capabilities 
Requirements to create a Capability Plan that governs the 
Cap Sponsor’s activities. Sitting on the JCB are the Deputy 
Defense Chief of Staff (Capability), the director for 
equipment resources, the director for science and 
technology strategy, the directors of battle space maneuver, 
precision attack and information superiority, the head of 
equipment capability secretariat and eleven Heads of 
Capability (HoCs). Each of the HoCs is responsible for an 
area of capability, for which they define the requirements 
and identify “equipment-based options that are coherent 
across all DLoDs” [11]. The HoCs chair one or more 
Capability Management Groups (CMG), that support them 
in managing their respective capability areas. The CMGs 
are responsible for setting capability priorities and to carry 
out trades between projects within and between their 
respective capability areas.  
 In the Capability Planning Groups (CPG), the MoD 
unified customer with representatives from the five 
stakeholders within the MoD community including the Cap 
Sponsor (deciding member), users, Defense Estates, 
Defense Equipment and Support (DE&S) and Science, 
Innovation and Technology (S I T), are responsible for 
developing cross-DLoD solutions to the force groupings 
decided by the Cap Sponsor. The CPG also sets up program 
boards for projects that span multiple DLoDs. The program 
boards handle one or more projects each. The HoCs act as 
Senior Responsible Owners (SROs) for their respective 
program boards and project teams. Contracts with are 
placed with industry via DE&S. 
 The TLCM concept involves the MoD and industry 
working together in partnership, to the point where industry 
and MoD personnel work together as one integrated 
organization. For this reason, engagement with industry 
should start early, beginning at the capability planning 
phase in order to provide valuable input concerning aspects 
such as technical maturity, industrial threats and 
opportunities, export considerations and cost. As capability 
planning progresses to the awarding of contracts to industry 
in the capability generation phase and further into 
capability operation and eventual termination and disposal 
phases, the relationships and interdependencies between the 
MoD and industry continue and develop. This results in the 
boundaries between the roles of the industry and the MoD 
in the enterprise becoming blurred. The emphasis on 
capability rather than equipment or systems also shifts the 
emphasis on the end-user away from that as the customer 
and towards that as part of the capability being sought. 
Consequently, from a systems perspective the role of the 
customer falls on the body that orders the military 
capability to be used, i.e. the government, with the MoD 
and industry together acting as the supplier.  
3.3.2 Interactions 
 For the sake of clarity, the diagram does not include 
separate boxes for all the HoCs, CMGs, CPGs and program 
boards and so it does not reflect any interactions between 
these different organizational elements. However, these 
interactions do exist and they are many in number. They 
are predominantly functional in nature reflecting the need 
for the different bodies involved in TLCM planning to 
share information and knowledge across capability areas 
and programs. The intensity of interactions is not 
unproblematic however. These relationships can be 
modeled should they need arise to analyze them further. On 
the training course delegates heard examples of how CPGs 
struggle with having to attend and monitor developments 
discussed in more meetings held by other CPGs than there 
are personnel available to attend them. This leads CPGs, to 
decide which meetings are the most important for them to 
attend, respectively, and to monitor the rest remotely via 
telephone, in the hope that, if they need to interface with a 
CPG whose meetings they are not attending, that someone 
from this other CPG will contact them to get them 
involved. The need to adopt this method of working was 
confirmed by delegates involved with TLCM from across 
the MoD.  
 Course delegates and interviewees raised concerns 
about the effects of causal interactions between projects as 
the interdependencies of projects become difficult to get an 
overview of, especially when they encompass several 
DLoDs. This may be relatively “easy” during the planning 
stage but may be much more difficult to keep sight of when 
programs are up and running and, for example, there are 
calls for changes in the specifications. The domino-effect 
of any approved changes may not only change how the 
DLoDs are developed in relation to each other, but also the 
time at which outputs, whether material or not, are 
delivered. This in turn will affect any project that is 
dependant on those outputs in order to function properly.  
3.3.3 Control and Structures 
 Control of acquisition within the MoD is centralized 
in one body, the Capability Sponsor, who makes decisions 
relating to new equipment and equipment support and to 
whom the delivery teams and program boards are 
accountable. In discussions during the course, comments 
were made about the large number of reports that are 
created for the HoCs sitting in the Cap Sponsor in order to 
inform their decisions and the vast amount of information 
that they need understand and “keep in their heads”.  
 Although the structures of the MoD TLCM 
organization appear to be hierarchical, the comments about 
the information overload on decision makers in the system 
may indicate that, although the top level officers have the 
power to decide, the experts in the organization have a 
significant influence on the decisions made. We need to 
study this further to understand these relationships. 
However, even if the acquisition organization within the 
MoD is adopting a integrated approach and structure, it is 
surrounded by and interacting with an organization that is 
very hierarchical. Comments have been made that the 
cross-DLoD and tri-service approach to capability 
planning, generation and operation in TLCM is not 
consistent with the work of core business management 
functions such as career progression planning, and 
distribution of competencies and training which are single 
service based.  
 Observers in industry and academia of the 
implementation of TLCM comment on how planning and 
management is driven by a view of capability as being 
based around equipment platforms and that can be seen in 
how capabilities are grouped into capability areas in a way 
that reflects a “stovepipe” approach to management.  
3.3.4 Processes, behaviors and people  
 As mentioned above, beyond the capability planning 
phase, the processes to support TLCM are still being 
developed. Consequently there is, as yet, no set process for 
how “to do” TLCM. Instead, emphasis is put on the need to 
adopt behaviors that support the principles and ambitions 
of TLCM as spelled out in the Defense Values for 
Acquisition which include: 
 Recognize that people are the key to success  
 Distinguish between the must haves, desirables 
and the nice to haves, if affordable.  
 Identify trade offs between performance, time 
and cost.  
 Never assume additional resources will be 
available 
 Understand that delays cost  
 Think incrementally to allow for change along 
the way and to use best practice.  
 Quantify risk and reduce it by placing it where it 
can be managed most effectively.  
 Recognize and respect the contribution made by 
Industry 
 Value openness and transparency  
 Embed a through life culture in all planning and 
decision making.  
 Value objectivity based on clear evidence and 
learn from past experiences.  
 People are held to account for their performance.  
 The comments, discussions and questions raised 
during the course, as well as discussions with 
representatives from industry and academia revealed that 
the TLCM initiative is regarded with a significant degree of 
skepticism by both sides of the defense community. Several 
comments were made about TLCM being replaced by some 
new initiative in five years’ time. Lecturers and guest 
speakers on the course all emphasized that although the 
TLCM label will change, the underlying principles of 
TLCM will be carried forward in any new acquisition 
initiatives.  
 The required rate of transition for the MoD is high. 
TLCM is expected to be fully implemented by 2012, by 
which time all the Mood’s planning processes will be 
aligned to this paradigm. 
4 Discussion 
 As with all models of complex systems, the model 
does not capture the “truth” about the TLCM enterprise, 
only a limited aspect of it and, with the TLCM concept 
evolving as it is being implemented in practice, the 
structures and interactions are expected to change. 
However, the model highlights challenges that will need to 
be addressed if TLCM, and capability management, is to be 
realized in the form currently being proposed.  
 First, as mentioned above, the model does not depict 
the many interactions between the different CPGs, CMGs, 
program boards, delivery teams, DLoDs and the industrial 
partners, because including them would make the model 
too unclear. However, the effectiveness and smoothness 
with which these interactions take place is essential for the 
success of the TLCM endeavor. This will depend greatly 
on the extent to which the individuals involved understand 
their role and contribution to the TLCM enterprise as a 
whole, as this will influence the extent and the way in 
which they share, access and process information. The 
reserve with which TLCM is perceived within the defense 
community seems to indicate that this insight is not as 
widely spread as may be required.  
 Second, the success of TLCM also depends on the 
degree of trust between the organizations as well as the 
individuals involved both between industry and the MoD as 
well as within the MoD and industry sectors respectively. 
This is of particular importance if the MoD is to engage 
with industry early in the capability planning stages. That is 
to say that capability will be enhanced through effective 
interactions between the supply chain organizations [28].  
 Third, the cross-DLoD approach to capability delivery 
challenges many people involved in TLCM. Moving from 
an equipment focused approach to acquisition, to one that 
requires all the lines of development to be given equal 
consideration as applicable, requires a new way of 
reasoning that can be described as systems thinking or 
systems awareness which, as discussed in the earlier part of 
this paper, in many ways is the opposite of an hierarchical, 
linear approach which characterizes the military 
organization as a whole. It also increases the amount of 
information that those responsible for planning, 
management, and bringing all the DLoDs together, need to 
process and “keep in their heads” - both in the MoD and in 
industry. From this perspective, the observed trend toward 
a “stovepipe” approach to capability acquisition 
management described above could be interpreted as an 
attempt by engineers and managers to simplify, albeit 
inappropriately, an increasingly complex information and 
organizational context. 
 Fourth, as a complex system, TLCM will never be 
finished and so the enterprise will be constantly evolving. 
The TLCM enterprise is a distributed knowledge system; 
not only do the organizations and individuals involved need 
process more interactions, they must also actively and 
continuously scan the enterprise to identify and locate new 
knowledge within it to inform and improve decision 
making, thereby contributing to even more interactions and 
feedback loops.  
 Fifth, TLCM involves a change in the fundamental 
concepts involved in acquisition. The grouping together of 
the MoD and industry as collaborative suppliers of 
capability is culturally challenging to those used to a more 
traditional customer-supplier terms. Both the 
Government/top level command and the soldier, sailor, 
aircrew are end-users of capabilities, but they are end users 
of very different levels of abstraction of capability. The 
collaborative nature of capability generation between 
Government and industry has both similarities and stark 
differences at these different levels. 
 Finally, the output from TLCM is improved 
management of capability through life. It is undeniable that 
the cross-capability and cross DLoDs approach to 
capability acquisition and the associated integrated supply 
chain involves major technical and engineering challenges 
that must be managed in a comprehensive and coordinated 
manner. TLCM aims to deliver this integrated approach to 
capability management  
 The enterprise mapping of TLCM reported above has 
indicated the complexity of the emerging MoD-industry 
relationship. In many ways this has raised more questions 
(enumerated above) than it has answered. The next stage of 
this research will be to focus more particularly on the inter-
relationships generated by the TLCM concept in order to 
understand more fully the impact on the acquisition 
processes. 
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